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This theoretical thesis explores the origins of the modern concept of “mental illness” and 
traces the development of the mental health consumer and psychiatric survivor movements, 
modern social justice movements that work to change and/or dismantle the system of oppression 
that has long denied those labeled mentally ill the right to make basic decisions about their own 
lives. Working from a critical theoretical frame influenced by historical discourse analysis and 
post-structuralist theory, the thesis first examines the multiple constructions of madness and 
mental distress in the Western world since the Middle Ages, suggesting that the current 
biomedical model of mental illness is similarly constructed by modern social, political, and 
economic forces. Attention is then turned to the mental health consumer and psychiatric survivor 
movements, and the discourse utilized by each movement to challenge the dominant biomedical 
discourse. Finally, implications for social workers and other progressive/dissident mental health 
professionals are explored. Ultimately, this thesis suggests that ethical clinical practice is 
possible when clinicians listen to the voices of those they serve and continue to question how 
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 The field of social work has, from its inception, been concerned with the task of 
ameliorating suffering. The earliest social workers concerned themselves with what were seen at 
the time as social issues, particularly poverty and women’s rights (Healy, 2008). As the field – 
for better or for worse – has become professionalized and aligned with psychology, many social 
workers have begun to focus more on what is referred to as mental health and mental illness, 
historically the purview of the fields of psychiatry and psychology (Tomes, 2008). 
 However, clinical social work remains qualitatively different from psychology. Our field 
has its roots in social justice and remains focused on a person-in-environment understanding of 
individual struggles, setting it apart from other clinical fields (Stewart, 2013). An examination of 
the social work code of ethics (National Association of Social Workers, 2009) reveals a set of 
values based on this social justice history, charging social workers with the task of responding to 
human pain in a way that respects human dignity and individuals’ right to self-determination. 
A genuine commitment to these values necessitates a thoughtful examination of what is 
meant by concepts such as self-determination. In a recent review of social work literature on the 
topic, Scalfano (2013) points out that definitions of self-determination are numerous and diverse; 
there is significant contention as to the range and limitations of an individual’s right to make 
decisions about their own life. Given this, and given the history of social workers and other 
helping professionals participating in and perpetuating a range of social injustices in the name of 
help (Park, 2008a), it is imperative that we continue to interrogate the methods, models, and 
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theories of treatment that guide our work. It is not enough to merely assess their efficacy in 
treating certain ailments or addressing particular problems. We must also pursue meaningful 
discourse regarding the underlying purpose of any action taken in the name of help or treatment, 
honestly questioning whether those actions truly adhere to the values of human dignity and 
choice.  
Who makes decisions about what kind of help is available to which people? To whom are 
we responsible when attempting to provide that help – to the individual? To the agency or 
government or funding body? When does help stop being helpful and become a mechanism of 
social control over the behaviors of those who have been deemed different or deviant? In order to 
answer these questions, we must understand how we have come to conceptualize and address 
various problems and experiences in a historical context. 
Mental Illness and Mental Distress 
 Perhaps no topic lends itself to the kind of critical exploration suggested above as readily 
as our understanding and treatment of people who have heard voices, experienced extreme mood 
states, or had other experiences that are currently understood as evidence of mental illness 
(Clegg, 2012). Current approaches to treatment are vastly different from those accepted in the 
past, and all are rooted inextricably in their historical, political, and social contexts (Smith, 
2012); a truly rigorous analysis must take into account social forces well beyond medical or 
other treatment-oriented professions. Of particular interest to social work, with its dual focus on 
clinical care and social justice, are the questions delineated above: who makes decisions? Why is 
this the case? Who is truly served? 
 The term “mental illness” is itself a product of a particular historical moment and a 
particular framework of understanding. It has not always been the case that mental distress has 
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been viewed as an illness analogous to a medical condition and, therefore, treatable by biological 
means such as medication (Gomory, Cohen, & Kirk, 2013). A wide range of fields including 
theology, psychology, forensics, and biology have long been concerned with the thoughts, 
emotions, and behaviors that are currently seen as evidence of a mental or brain-based illness 
(Pfeifer, 2006; Smith, 2012), seeking to understand their meaning and cause as well as their 
treatment. Indeed, “treatment” as such has not always been the social response to mental distress 
(Grob, 1991). Depending on the moment in history, the cultural context, and the various 
identities of those involved, what is now seen as mental illness has been understood in widely 
differing ways. These frameworks of understanding – be they religious, moral, social, medical, 
etc. – have engendered corresponding responses well beyond the biomedical framework favored 
today (Grob, 1991; Smith, 2012).  
 Linking these seemingly disparate approaches is a common thread: an essentially top-
down framework in which decision-making and interpretive power is held by an outside force, 
be that a religious authority or a medical doctor (Emerick, 1996; Everett, 1994). Particularly in 
the last century, however, social movements have arisen that argue for a different approach to the 
phenomenon of mental distress, and this thesis is concerned first and foremost with them. Across 
differences in ideology, these approaches have at their center the knowledge, experience, and 
motivation of those who have experienced these extreme states in their own lives (Adame & 
Knudson, 2007; Everett, 1994). Rooted in liberation and civil rights activism, these movements 
call into question long-accepted assertions about the meaning – or even the existence – of mental 
illness as a discrete and identifiable entity. They argue persuasively against any notion that those 
labeled mentally ill are less equipped to understand and make decisions about their own lives  
(Chamberlin, 1998; Masterson & Owen, 2006). 
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Structural Overview of the Thesis  
 As summarized above, this thesis will focus on the culturally bound and ever-changing 
meaning of mental illness in Western society. Given the stated commitment of clinical social 
work to approaching individuals and groups in a way that is both conceptually and practically 
respectful of their right to make choices about their lives, the purpose of this work is to pay 
attention to the voices of those people who have themselves been labeled mentally ill. Two 
related but undeniably different social movements will be explored, each of which has emerged 
as a response to existing systems of treatment, and each of which influences and interacts with 
systems of service provision for those labeled mentally ill.  
Within the theoretical thesis format, mental distress/mental illness and its treatment is 
framed as the phenomenon, which will be examined through the theories – the values and ideas – 
of each of the two social movements. The first of these is the mental health consumer movement, 
which is closely linked to disability rights activism and the independent living movement 
(Jacobson & Greeley, 2001). In the past half-century, “recovery models” based on the tenets of 
the consumer movement have become the primary framework for service provision to people 
with “psychiatric disabilities” in the United States and Canada, and are relatively common in the 
United Kingdom (Campbell, 1991; Everett, 1994). The second perspective that will be explored 
in this thesis is that of the psychiatric survivor movement. Also concerned with individual rights 
and self-determination, this movement questions the existence of mental illness as a distinct 
entity (Plumb, 1993). Instead, the psychiatric survivor movement understands the phenomenon 
as a distress response to unbearable social and environmental stressors (Adame & Knudson, 
2007). 
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 Following this introduction, the next chapter of this work (Ch. II) will lay out the critical 
theoretical framework through which I will explore the phenomenon of mental distress and its 
social construction. This framework will draw on post-structuralist philosophy and associated 
methods of inquiry that allow for a critical examination of social, economic, and political forces 
that shape the manifestation of human behavior as well as the language that we use to discuss 
and describe it. Chapter II will also lay out my own position as a researcher and the potential 
perspectives and biases that my experience may bring to this thesis. 
Chapter III will undertake a fuller exploration of the history of extreme states of mental 
distress, as well as the current state of understanding and treatment. As has already been 
established, there has by no means been a consistent framework for defining the concept of 
mental illness, let alone a consensus regarding its meaning or etiology (Clegg, 2012; Gomory et 
al, 2013). This work will attempt to trace the arc of this ever-changing phenomenon as it has 
existed in its various social and historical contexts. It will also seek to establish the current state 
of affairs, taking a position that questions claims of enduring or universally accepted 
explanations. 
 Chapter IV will focus on the mental health consumer movement. This chapter will take 
an in-depth view of the movement, including its roots in ex-mental patient consciousness raising 
and advocacy (Chamberlin, 1978), and in the disability rights and independent living movements 
(Jacobson & Greeley, 2001). Concepts such as “psychiatric disability”, and “consumer”, which 
are commonly used in systems of service provision today, will be placed in their social and 
historical contexts, emerging from the activism and research of those involved in this movement. 
 In Chapter V, the focus will turn to the psychiatric survivor movement. The ways in 
which this movement is intertwined with the work of consumer and disability rights advocacy 
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(Everett, 1994) will be explored, as well as the points of divergence that mark the differences 
between those who understand themselves to have a psychiatric disability and those who seek to 
undermine or call into question the existence of mental illness or psychiatric disability as an 
identifiable and discrete entity (Adame & Knudson, 2007).  
 Chapter VI will discuss and synthesize the preceding chapters. The ideas and activism of 
the consumer and psychiatric survivor movements will be explored again through individual 
stories of madness, and various ways of approaching extreme mental distress will be examined in 
light of the movements as well as in the context of current treatment standards. The perspectives 
of radical and crossover clinicians – those who sit at the intersection of consumer, survivor, and 
provider (Bassman, 1997) – will be integrated as well. Finally, questions will be raised in light of 
this analysis, and implications for those engaged in clinical and social justice work around issues 
of mental health and mental illness, self-determination, and policy-making will be explored. 
In sum, this thesis will seek to deepen understanding of the influence of civil rights and 
liberation movements on dominant approaches to mental health and mental illness through the 
lenses of the mental health consumer and psychiatric survivor movements. It will offer a 
snapshot of where the movements stand today, their relationship to the dominant paradigm 
regarding mental distress, and suggest areas of further exploration for those concerned with 













A Critical Theoretical Frame 
While this thesis is not specifically a work of philosophy, I found myself in need of a 
philosophical frame as I approached the task of outlining and understanding the phenomenon of 
madness as a way to provide context for the social movements I wish to study. In my struggle to 
define and contain the concept of madness, I found myself again and again facing the 
impossibility of tracking this moving target as a static thing. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
this work takes a questioning position, reluctant to accept a particular notion of truth and ever-
aware of the shaping forces of history. In order to remain true to this approach, I needed a 
framework that could allow me to focus not simply on the phenomenon itself, but on the myriad 
forces – knowledge, power - that have shaped it. 
This thesis takes as its primary subjects social movements that are actively seeking to 
effect change in the name of justice and freedom. As such, I sought an approach to the historical 
part of the work that would take a critical stance – not simply reporting facts, but questioning 
their validity and constantly seeking to contextualize knowledge and understanding. In my 
search for a guiding framework, I found my way to post-structuralism (Sarup, 1989), and from 
there to critical theory (Wodak, 2009) Finally, I arrived at critical discourse analysis, and 
specifically historical discourse analysis (HDA) – an approach to social science research that 
seeks “not to find truths about past events or to identify the origins or causes of past events, but 
to expose history as a genre—contingent, ambiguous, and interpretive” (Park, 2008b, p. 394). 
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HDA is not a step-by-step method of analysis, but a framework in which to wrestle with ideas 
and events in their historical context. Its post-structuralist, and specifically Foucauldian, roots 
encourage a critical and interpretive approach to the process of analysis as well as to the subject. 
As such, rather than attempting to apply some kind of “pure” HDA to the phenomenon of 
madness, my hope is to explore the topic with the critical, interpretive, and social-change-minded 
lens demanded by this type of analysis. 
In this chapter, I will give a brief overview of historical discourse analysis and its 
philosophical and ideological roots. Having done this, I will outline how this analysis will inform 
the thesis. Next, I will turn to the issue of language, particularly important in an analysis that is 
based on examining discourse. Finally, I will discuss the strengths and limitations of this study, 
focusing in particular on my own identities, motivations, and discursive position as a social 
worker, a researcher, and a human being. 
Post-Structuralism 
As mentioned above, historical and critical discourse analyses are research frameworks 
based in a post-structuralist – specifically a Foucauldian - approach (Park, 2006; Wodak, 2009).  
Post-structuralism is a philosophical theory that arose in the wake of the subject-based theories 
such as existentialism that had prevailed in Western thought through the mid-twentieth century 
(Oksala, 2008). For the purposes of this thesis, post-structuralism’s most salient tenet is its 
challenge to the notion that meaning is static or exists independently of perception. Post-
structuralism argues that meaning is embedded in instability: it is created and enforced by social 
forces and the narratives (called “master-narratives”) that emerge from these forces (Oksala, 
2008). History, then, is not an independently existing account of past events, but a story that is 
told about belief systems and how power has circulated in various times and places (Sarup, 1989).  
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Foucault’s particular take on post-structuralist thought lends itself especially well to this 
thesis because it is specifically a critical theory – that is, a radical philosophy seeking social 
change. Foucault did not offer a concrete explanation for the world as it is or as it has been, but 
repeatedly asked questions that are inherently without definitive answers, and charged his 
readers to do the same. Philosophy and history, in this framework, are tools that are to be put to 
the task of “relentlessly question[ing] dogmatic beliefs and intolerable practices in contemporary 
society. We should read him for no lesser reason than to change the world” (Oksala, 2008, p.5).  
Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis is one approach to implementing Foucault’s imperative. It attempts to 
examine history through the lens of discourse, which in this case refers to the linguistic, political, 
and social forces that shape meaning and action (de Pinho, Kantorski, & Bañon Hernández, 
2009). Park (2006) discusses at length the challenges inherent in applying a critical analysis to 
historical matters, “resisting the pull of conventional linear history” (p. 173). She also grapples 
with the necessarily incomplete nature of any attempt at such an analysis, acknowledging that a 
full analysis would have to include “nothing less than the total recounting of the shapes and tenor 
of the political, social, cultural, and moral reckonings” (p. 173) that together comprise a given 
discourse. Not only is such a task unrealistic, but it is not loyal to the deconstructive nature of the 
analysis itself. 
 In the spirit of this central conflict, this thesis will be inspired and informed by the thrust 
of critical and historical discourse analyses without attempting to exactly recreate the 
methodology exemplified by Park (2006; 2008c), for instance, or de Pinho et al ( 2009). It will 
grapple with the discourses that have shaped the changing meanings of madness, maintaining an 
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awareness of these meanings as reflective of social forces and the mechanisms in place to 
enforce social norms. 
Language 
Critical discourse analysis and its historical relative, historical discourse analysis (Park, 
2006; Park, 2008c) take language – the specific use of individual words, phrases, or larger 
chunks of text – as their primary units of analysis. That is, in order to understand history as a 
genre, they look to the ways that language shapes and reinforces – and, in turn, is shaped by and 
reinforced by – historical constructs and ideas. As discussed earlier, this thesis is not a pure 
historical discourse analysis, but rather is influenced by the social consciousness and interpretive 
stance of the approach. That being said, it would be deeply remiss to ignore the reality that, in 
writing this piece, the language I choose to discuss historical phenomena is not separate from the 
phenomena themselves. There are countless words and phrases that I could use to write about 
madness, and those words are embedded in social and historical contexts that participate in the 
construction of the phenomenon. If we accept this premise, language choice becomes in itself an 
act of social change.  
The language used to describe and interpret what is now often referred to as “mental 
illness” has varied widely over the course of history and in accordance with the systems of 
knowledge and power in place in a given historical moment (Gomory et al, 2013).  In writing 
about these moments, I can use the words of the time period to a certain extent, but not without a 
critical stance, understanding that the language does not exist separately from the social forces 
that created it. Certainly, when writing about the social movements that are at the heart of this 
thesis, I will use the language embraced by each movement: each movement has, after all, 
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chosen the words it will use to refer to itself and its members with the understanding that 
language changes how we think and react to the world around us (Adame & Knudson, 2007).  
If the language I use to discuss movements and systems of understanding will be the 
language used within those movements and systems, I am left still with the task of choosing the 
words I will use in the thesis as a whole. This is not an easy task, and I have struggled to come to 
a decision that feels both practical and mindful of the constructive – and therefore potentially 
helpful or harmful – nature of words and word usage. Ultimately I have chosen to use the words 
“madness” and “mental distress”, more or less interchangeably, as the default names for the 
phenomenon at hand. The reason for this choice is that these words are essentially non-clinical; 
in today’s medicalized environment, the language of disease and disorder has infused both 
professional and lay discourses (Gomory et al., 2013), and to default to the term “mental illness” 
would be to privilege this discourse over that of dissenting voices. While this is not a perfect 
choice, it has been made consciously; while I cannot – as none of us can – step completely 
outside the prevailing discourses of the moment in which I write, my choice of language has at 
least been made with this understanding in mind. 
Definition of Terms   
For the purposes of this thesis, “madness” and “mental distress” will be used more or less 
interchangeably to refer to the kinds of psychological, emotional, and possibly spiritual 
experiences that are today generally referred to as “mental illness”, and particularly “severe and 
persistent mental illness”. I will not attempt to narrow these categories down diagnostically, 
given that diagnostic categories are context dependent and employ language based solidly in the 
discourse of the biomedical model (Clegg, 2012). The term “mental distress” will be used 
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judiciously, because it contains within it an interpretive evaluation of individual experience – an 
assumption that the experience is, in fact, distressing or unpleasant. 
Strengths and Limitations 
What does it mean to engage with a topic as diffuse and wide-reaching as madness in the 
context of the limited scope of a master’s thesis project? One thing that it inevitably means is 
that this project is incomplete. No one document can fully explore and illuminate the historical 
discourse surrounding the concept of madness, nor can such a document do full justice to the 
complex and discourse-changing influence of the social movements that will be examined. I take 
on this project with the full understanding that it is merely a drop in the proverbial bucket. At the 
same time, it is in the spirit of social change that I have chosen to write about this topic, and 
social change cannot begin without critical engagement, even in the most general way. As such, I 
look at this thesis as a beginning point for myself as a scholar, a clinician, and an activist, and it 
is my hope that as I wrestle with the ideas in this thesis I can offer to others a space for their own 
questioning. 
On a more practical note, I want to acknowledge that I have chosen to look separately at 
the mental health consumer and psychiatric survivor movements, despite the fact that there is 
disagreement both from within and outside of the movements as to whether or not they are 
indeed separate from one another at all (Adame & Knudson, 2007; Everett, 1994).My choice to 
separate them and examine each on its own is based in my interest in discourse and my 
understanding that the consumer movement and the psychiatric survivor movement are seeking 
to change the prevailing discourse in different, though related, ways. There are many points of 
connection, and the movements have frequently both worked together towards common causes 
and been lumped together in error (Everett, 1994). In choosing to give each movement its own 
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chapter I hope to make space to listen to the unique voices and intentions of each as well as 
illuminate points of overlap and common goals.  
Finally, I want to turn my attention to my own role as writer and researcher. In keeping 
with the spirit of critical discourse analysis and its post-structuralist approach, I have no intention 
of attempting to erase my own presence from this thesis. My choice of topic and most of all my 
approach to this topic is deeply informed by my personal and professional lived experience. I am 
an emerging clinician and therefore a “provider” of services, to use the language of the mental 
health field. My thoughts and my research about madness are therefore informed by my 
education, my clinical experience, and my experience as someone who is privileged within the 
system of power that encompasses the provision of mental health services.  
At the same time, I am a person who has lived experience of mental distress that has, at 
times, been profound and life-altering. I have been personally influenced – primarily in ways that 
I consider positive – by providers of services, particularly psychotherapy. I must also 
acknowledge that I have held significant privilege as a “consumer” or “patient”, in that my other 
identities (particularly my whiteness, my education, and my middle class background) have 
protected me from the kind of abject oppression experienced by many who interact with the 
systems currently in place to help or control people labeled mentally ill. My distress has also 
largely manifested in ways that are more socially sanctioned than in the case of people who hear 
voices or have more unusual experiences of reality, and so I have been primarily approached as a 
person in pain and needing help rather than a social deviant or someone who is ill. I cannot call 
myself a psychiatric survivor, for instance, but nor can I artificially distance myself from those 
who have been oppressed in more overt ways by the system that has helped me. As I write this 
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thesis, it is my intention to actively and openly acknowledge my own experiences and identities 



















































The Social Construction of Madness 
History tells us that human beings have always been concerned with issues of difference 
and deviance in individual and group behavior (Gomory et al, 2013). What changes, as has 
already been discussed in this work, is the framework – the system of knowledge and 
understanding through which we interpret and respond to these varying experiences and 
behaviors (Park, 2006). A critical historical lens makes it possible to explore the social, 
economic, and political forces that have shaped these responses and understandings in earlier 
moments, but it is more difficult to see the same forces at play in the present. And yet, because 
these forces are not impartial, because they shape how human beings are treated, social justice 
demands that we turn the same critical lens on the present as we do on the past.  
In the previous chapter, I outlined the critical theoretical and methodological approach 
that informs this thesis. In this chapter, I will use that approach to examine the past and present 
of the phenomenon of madness in the Western world, as well as the discourses that have shaped 
and interacted with the phenomenon. Particular attention will be paid to the allocation of power 
and knowledge and the ways in which that allocation has constructed the concept and 
manifestation of madness and mental distress.  
It is not the goal of this chapter to catalogue or describe every twist and turn in the story 
of this phenomenon; not only would this be impossible, but it would be antithetical to the goals 
of critical theory (Park, 2006). Rather, the goal is to capture a sample, a representation of the 
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changing discourses surrounding the phenomenon of madness, in order to better understand the 
discourse of today and to set the stage for the emergence of the civil rights movements that are 
the true subjects of this thesis. In order to do this, I have chosen several historical moments that 
were significant turning points in the construction of madness in the Western world, and will 
undertake a brief analysis of the discourses at play in each of those moments. I will then turn a 
similar critical lens on the current dominant discourse, the biomedical model of psychiatry 
(Deacon, 2013).  
The Middle Ages: Madness as a Mind/Body Affliction 
 The majority of literature on the phenomenon of madness during the middle ages in 
Europe and the Middle East suggests that the division between mind and body so commonly 
accepted in modern philosophy had not yet taken hold (Harper, 1997). Madness, then, was 
expressed as an external (spectacular) manifestation of a simultaneously internal and external 
experience, thought to be of the body as well as of the spirit, and often associated with religious 
possession or affliction. The mad were identifiable by their behavior, and treatment was largely 
physical in nature, an attempt to balance the body in order to balance the spirit (Eghigian, 2009).  
 In its manifestation, medieval madness served what Harper (1997) calls “a didactic 
function” (p. 387): madness, like all illness, was frequently perceived to be a divine punishment 
for sin, and its visibility served as “dire warnings of the physical consequences of spiritual 
turpitude” (p. 387-388). The symptoms were easily identifiable and classified into discreet 
categories (maniacs screamed and rent their clothes; melancholics could be identified by their 
darkened skin from excess black bile, etc.). Treatment for the inner (spiritual) condition was 
performed on the outer, bodily form. Prayer was also thought to be an appropriate remedy for 
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some kinds of madness that were understood to be spiritual afflictions or demonic possession 
(Nguyen-Finn, 2012).  
 Power and knowledge during this time period were held by the church and systems of 
feudal government (Nguyen-Finn, 2012). The discourse of sin and spiritual affliction acted as an 
interpretive lens for the behaviors that were understood as madness. The visible and clearly 
unpleasant physical symptoms of the afflicted served as cautionary tales, warning those around 
them of the perils of deviant behavior and reinforcing the power of religious and feudal 
obedience.  
The Industrial Revolution: Warehousing the Mad 
 The industrial revolution marked a significant change in the size and density of 
communities, centralizing populations in cities rather than spread out in small agricultural 
settlements. Population also increased overall, as access to healthcare and adequate diet 
increased. This time also marked a shift in the allocation of responsibility for the care of those 
individuals deemed to be mad or unable to care for themselves due to disability or poverty (Grob, 
1991).  
 With these social and economic changes came the advent of the workhouse (Grob, 1991): 
not a place of treatment but a warehouse for people who – due to any number of internal and 
external factors – were not able to meet their own material needs within the industrial system. In 
return for barely life-sustaining food and shelter, workhouse residents labored at menial jobs for 
long hours under abhorrent conditions. 
 What is striking about this development is the lack of distinction made between the mad, 
the impoverished, the criminal, and the disabled at this time (Sarup, 1989). Rather than being 
punished or saved, as might have been the case in the Middle Ages, in the industrial age 
   18 
“between [the destitute person] and society an implicit system of obligation was established: he 
had the right to be fed, but he must accept the physical and moral constraint of confinement” 
(Foucault, 1967, p. 48). The discipline of confinement and of work served to control and to keep 
separate those whose behavior or attributes – be they endemic or externally caused – did not 
conform to the norms of the newly industrialized society. 
The 19th Century: Asylums and Moral Treatment 
 By the early 19th century, the failure of generalized confinement and workhouses to 
address issues of deviance as well as unemployment had been largely accepted by those in power 
(Sarup, 1989). At the same time, a growing focus on humanitarian reform drew attention to what 
was seen as the particular needs and characteristics of the mad as opposed to other deviants, 
marking a shift from the mass warehousing of the destitute and deviant more common to the 17th 
and 18th centuries. The notion that the mad needed treatment and that mass confinement might in 
fact be making them worse caused a great deal of public concern and unrest (Symonds, 1995). 
 From this unrest came policy changes such as the Lunacy Act of 1845 in England, which 
made provisions for the custody and treatment of the mad separate from the confinement of the 
criminal and unemployed (Symonds, 1995). Reformers such as Tuke in England and Pinel in 
France have been credited with the beginning of the asylum movement; the word asylum 
suggesting refuge for the mad from the dangers of the workhouse. Some have argued, however, 
that asylums may have served more to protect the public – including the poor and the criminal 
previously housed with the mad – from the “frightening bestiality of the madman” (Sarup, 1989, 
p. 68). 
 Asylums, particularly those modeled after Tuke in England, advocated what was called a 
“moral treatment” for madness (Luchins, 1988). Reformers in the United States as well as in 
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England and continental Europe advocated treatment for the mad that was based on utopian 
ideals popular among the educated classes at the time. Asylums were places where, with proper 
care and guidance, afflicted individuals “could perfect themselves, to be rid of sin and to be 
transformed, saved… the insane could be transformed so that they could return to society as 
healthy and productive people” (Luchins, 1988, p. 472-473). Treatment included both religious 
and occupational activities (prayer, agricultural work) and took place in a carefully coordinated 
environment in which even the architecture of the asylum was seen to be an aspect of treatment 
(Shilkret, 2008). Patients were restored to health not simply when they ceased to display deviant 
behaviors, but when they demonstrated reformed thoughts: when they agreed with the necessity 
of their treatment and showed the ability to resist immoral urges (Luchins, 1989). 
 Embedded in this ideology is yet another iteration of the belief that the mad must be 
somehow controlled or reformed. The “kindness” of the moral treatment approach might 
alternately be seen as paternalistic control, wielding power over not only the behaviors but, 
ultimately, the thoughts and desires of its patients. While asylums freed the bodies of the mad 
from the physical violence of the workhouse, Foucault (as cited in Sarup, 1989) described this 
transition as one of internalization: where once there was external confinement, moral treatment 
imposed mental and spiritual imprisonment that had a similar managing effect on those deemed 
most deviant. 
The Early 20th Century: Mental Hygiene and the Medicalization of the Mind 
 In the first decades of the 20th century, two separate movements – one social and one 
medical – emerged that once again changed the face of mental health treatment and the 
understanding of madness. Arising in response to the failing, overburdened asylums that had 
previously been the primary location for treatment of madness, somatic psychiatry and the 
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mental hygiene movement began the slow push towards community-based care that we see today 
(Pols, 2001). These movements also set the stage for the rise of the biomedical model (Cohen, 
1993), which will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. 
 Somatic psychiatry. Well into the beginning of the 20th century, the field of 
psychiatry was divided in its understanding of the etiology of the conditions it sought to treat. 
Those who ascribed to a somatic – that is, physiological – explanation were particularly 
committed to furthering research into the medical causes of what was now beginning to be 
referred to as mental illness. Using the rationale that, since mental illness did not appear to be 
declining in prevalence despite radical social changes, the somatic psychiatrists insisted that the 
conditions must be a result of biological disease processes, and that effective medical treatment 
would no doubt be discovered at any moment (Pols, 2001). Psychoanalytic theory, then still 
primarily the purview of psychiatry, was also on the rise at the time, and supported the view that 
mental illness was essentially a form of disease (Cohen, 1993). Somatic and psychoanalytic 
psychiatry gained power in the field over the first several decades of the century, in part in an 
effort to bolster the failing reputation of psychiatry as a less-than-credible arm of medicine (Hess 
& Majerus, 2011). 
 The mental hygiene movement. In parallel to the rise of psychiatry as a somatic 
field, a social movement emerged that became known as the mental hygiene movement. Where 
somatic psychiatry claimed that mental illness was a biological process, the mental hygienists 
believed that mental distress and the associated behaviors were primarily a result of social ills 
and should be addressed accordingly (Toms, 2010).  
 Mental hygiene originally arose in response to maltreatment of patients in asylums and 
mental hospitals (Pols, 2001). The moral treatment of the 19th century, while ideologically 
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distinct from the generalized confinement of previous eras, in practice often resulted in the same 
kind of warehousing and abuse that were common in earlier times (Symonds, 1995). Mental 
hygienists, led by one-time mental patient Clifford Beers, sought to address these abuses, but 
were ultimately persuaded to focus on prevention and early intervention of mental problems. 
They located these problems within the individual inasmuch as they were individual responses to 
social problems such as poverty, lack of education, etc. Interventions in mental hygiene were 
focused on structural preventive measures and involved professionals from a range of fields 
(social work, psychology, education) as well as lay activists (Pols, 2001). 
 The mind as a medical object. Despite their obviously divergent premises, mental 
hygiene and somatic psychiatry’s simultaneous growth produced a combined discourse that 
paved the way for the rise of the biomedical model in the later 20th century (Cohen, 1993). The 
important ideas were that external circumstances could exert their power to make identifiable 
changes in the mind of the individual (per the mental hygienists); and that the mind was an 
identifiable object to which medical treatment could be applied in a controlled way (per somatic 
psychiatry and psychoanalytic theory). Together, these ideas created an objectified and 
medicalized notion of the mind (Cohen, 1993), fueling what would become a lucrative industry 
for psychiatric medications and building fertile ground for a biomedical discourse of mental 
health and mental illness. 
The Biomedical Model 
 In the late twentieth and into the twenty-first century, the dominant discourse on madness 
is that of the medical model – specifically what is known as the biomedical model or disease 
model of mental illness (Deacon, 2013; Engel, 1992; Oken, 2000). The thrust of this discourse is 
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fairly easily summarized as “the notion that mental disorders are brain diseases” (Deacon, 2013, 
p. 847).  
 The biomedical model of mental illness is rooted in the larger biomedical model of 
disease, which works from an assumption that there is a normal state of health, from which 
illness indicates a deviation of some kind. Furthermore, these deviations are physiological and 
most appropriately corrected by physiological means (in the case of madness, largely through 
medications) (Double, 2002). Embedded within this framework is an assumption that deviations 
are consistent, identifiable, and measurable. 
Historical roots of the biomedical model. It might be surprising to the modern 
mind to realize that this idea is neither universally accepted nor has it always been the prevailing 
understanding of the phenomenon of madness. In fact, the biomedical model is a relatively 
modern invention and has been fueled in large part by entirely non-psychological (and often non-
medical) forces, particularly political and economic ones (Clegg, 2012; Deacon, 2013). These 
forces have shaped the current discourse sufficiently that we are often unaware of their power, 
which is essentially how discourse works (Park, 2006; Wodak, 2009).  
An analysis focused on systems of power and knowledge asks what groups or ideas are 
given power in a particular discourse (Park, 2006; Park, 2008c). In the case of the biomedical 
model, the language of health and illness places knowledge and power in the hands of doctors, of 
scientists, and in the economic interests of the companies that produce psychiatric drugs (Arney, 
2010; Cohen, 1993). Furthermore, power is still held (as it has almost always been) by those who 
make decisions for and about those who are affected. Illness is a special area of knowledge, and 
in this model the power to make someone well is in the hands of those who hold that knowledge.  
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The beliefs and associated allocations of power inherent in this discourse are self-
perpetuating, as are all mechanisms of power (Oksala, 2008). After all, it is in the interest of 
powerful entities to hold onto their power. In this case, the belief that mental illness is a disease 
contains within it an underlying belief that it is a problem to be solved: no one wants to be sick. 
That belief repeatedly hands power to those who have (or are believed to have) the knowledge 
and ability to “cure” mental illness, and those players (the medical field, the scientific research 
field, the companies that produce psychiatric drugs) have an interest in pursuing questions whose 
answers will lead back to the biomedical framework.  
 Achievements associated with the biomedical model.  It would be irresponsible, 
even in this obviously skeptical overview of the biomedical model, to ignore what good has 
come from it. There is no shortage of literature, both scientific and anecdotal, that attests to the 
relief that some people have found in medication as a form of symptom relief (National Institute 
of Mental Health, 2012). Whether or not one questions the demands that society places on 
individuals to conform or to live up to particular standards, it is undoubtedly the case that some 
have found that medications allow them to more easily or effectively meet those expectations. 
Additionally, many credit medication with drastic reduction in experiences that have felt utterly 
unbearable (National Institute of Mental Health, 2012). 
 One of the most oft-referenced effects or intentions of a move towards a biomedical 
model of mental illness is a reduction of stigma historically associated with madness. A 
physiological explanation for unusual behavior, according to this line of reasoning, removes 
blame from individuals: when one’s behavior is understood to be due to a “chemical imbalance”, 
for instance, it follows that one is not strange or bad, but is simply ill (Deacon, 2013). 
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 Some criticisms of the biomedical model. Popular discourse continues to 
perpetuate the belief that medicine has begun – and presumably will continue – to understand 
more and more about mental illness as such, systematically chipping away at the prevalence and 
negative impacts on individuals and society. Comparisons between mental illness and diabetes 
(both being seen as chronic medical problems to be managed by medical means) and the notion 
of chemical imbalance as an explanation for anxiety or sadness are some examples of the way in 
which the biomedical model has become part and parcel of how we think about mental distress 
(Arney, 2010; Double, 2003). Critics of the biomedical model argue that, despite the promises 
made by the medical field, aggressive focus on the physiological etiology of mental distress has 
not appreciably decreased the prevalence of mental illness, improved the quality of life of those 
who are served by the mental health system, or addressed the level of stigma faced by those who 
have been diagnosed with major mental illness (Cohen, 1993; Deacon, 2013; Engel, 1992).  
 Today, after over a century of the hegemony of biomedical discourse, neither statistical 
nor anecdotal data indicates a general improvement in the lives of people who have been labeled 
mentally ill (Deacon, 2013; Engel, 1992). The United States, where the biomedical model holds 
particular power, has the highest rates of prevalence and chronicity across diagnoses, as well as 
alarming increases in disability benefits being sought for mental health related concerns (Deacon, 
2013). Far from a testament to the effectiveness of the biomedical model, these numbers speak 
volumes about how far we are from adequately attending to the needs of people in distress. 
 In their analysis of language in historical writing on madness, Gomory et al (2013) 
suggest that the biomedical model and the language used to perpetuate it may serve as a 
smokescreen of sorts, concealing how little the medical field actually knows about the nature and 
etiology of mental distress: “…it remains an open question whether the psychiatric profession is  
   25 
treating medical diseases entailing impersonal pathophysiological processes, or instead 
responding to the moral and behavioral anguish of individuals failing in the  
game of life” (p. 124). 
Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to trace the phenomenon of madness in the Western 
world by looking at the discourses that have shaped it over the past several centuries. It is 
important to note that it is not only the understanding of madness that has changed throughout 
history, but also that the actual manifestations of distress have varied greatly depending on the 
context. Within a post-structuralist framework, we can understand these changes in manifestation 
to be responses to the changing allocations of knowledge and power that have shaped cultural 
discourses about madness over time. Rather than regurgitating accumulated knowledge, I have 
attempted to consider the social and political forces at play throughout history. 
The nature of discourse is that it is not always easy to “hear” it and to understand its 
power to shape our world. In focusing on the complexities of the current prevailing discourse, it 
is my intention to call into question what we think we know about what is referred to today as 
mental illness – to make visible the often-invisible discourse in order to engage with it critically. 
Today, just as in the past, the stories told by powerful voices shape not only what we believe, but 
the actual shape and nature of the phenomena around us. Viewed over time, one theme that 
emerges across the varied discourses is that of striving to change or control those who express 
deviant or unusual behavior. Whether the mad have been seen to be possessed, to be morally 
deficient, or to be ill, the systems of power have been activated to confine, reform, or medicate. 
To wrestle with the notion that the seemingly benign (offering medicine to the sick) might in fact 
be simply a reiteration of social control is the kind of analysis that is at the heart of this thesis. To 
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return again to the utility of this kind of critical engagement, we must acknowledge again that 
power is not neutral and discourse is seldom benign. Naming and exploring the discourses 
around madness shakes us out of complacency and makes space for questioning the status quo. 
This process of questioning also sets the stage for the next two chapters, which will take a 
more in-depth look at the psychiatric survivor movement and the consumer movement. Their 
individual and interrelated histories will be explored, with particular attention paid to their 
challenges to the dominant discourse. As civil rights efforts, these movements are essentially 
Foucauldian in nature: they trouble the complacency with which we listen to the “master-
narratives,” the stories that have been told and retold about why things are the way they are, and 
demand a redistribution of power and knowledge. While they are practical rather than theoretical 
movements, the critical theory approach to research lends itself beautifully to documenting and 





























The Mental Health Consumer Movement 
The previous chapter’s focus on current and historical understandings and frameworks of 
treatment for mental distress emphasized the history of top-down approaches to individual and 
community struggles with madness. In the next two chapters, I will focus on social movements 
that have challenged this expert or professionalized view, suggesting that lived experience is an 
equally valid – indeed, more valid – source of expertise than professional training and education. 
Each of these movements has grown out of a perspective that directly challenges the dominant 
discourse, offering new language and a new understanding of madness and mental distress. 
In the present chapter, we will turn our attention to the mental health consumer 
movement, also known as the mental health recovery movement. In recent years, the recovery 
model of mental health care has become the standard, at least in name, by which publically 
funded mental health service provision in the United States is measured and designed (Gordon, 
Ellis, Siegert, & Walkey, 2013). This model’s roots in disability self-advocacy are not always 
acknowledged – or possibly even known – by providers and service agencies. This chapter will 
strive to illuminate the discourse of the disability rights movement as it relates to the mental 
health consumer movement and its perspective on madness and mental distress. This framework 
will then provide a backdrop against which to examine the present-day implementation of a 
recovery model of care (Gordon et al, 2013; Slade et al, 2014) and to evaluate its effectiveness in 
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adhering to the values and intentions of those who fought to see it established and validated 
within the mental health care system (Bluebird, n.d.; Chamberlin, 1990). 
The Disability Rights Movement 
The term “consumer” is one that is familiar to most people in a market context – that is, a 
consumer of goods or services. Its use in the case of the “mental health consumer” is evidence of 
the mental health consumer movement’s connection to the disability rights movement: the civil 
rights movement that fought for passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(Myerson, 1992). The ADA, although it continues to be re-assessed and revised, was the 
culmination of decades of advocacy by activists fighting for an end to discrimination, abuse, and 
exclusion of people with disabilities from their communities, with wide-ranging effects in social, 
educational, employment, and economic realms (Perlin, 2000). Where these exclusions had been 
seen as natural results of a person’s affliction or condition, the disability rights movement 
worked to place them in context as civil rights abuses that must be remedied. Disability was 
relocated outside of the individual body or mind and into the structure of a society that does not 
provide accommodations for different abilities (Shakespeare, 2006). 
The term “consumer” is one offshoot of the protections provided by the ADA, indicating 
choice and agency by people with disabilities over their environments and with regard to services. 
The term is one that is firmly rooted in capitalism, with its emphasis on individual choice and 
individual rights. To be a consumer, rather than a patient or invalid, connotes full citizenship in a 
capitalist system of selecting and purchasing goods and services. The disability rights movement 
has continued to advocate for consumers’ rights to independent living, to accommodations that 
allow equal access to housing, work, and education. In her brief history of the disability rights 
movement, Arlene Myerson (1992) succinctly states the movement’s underlying assumption 
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“that people with disabilities want to work and are capable of working, want to be members of 
their communities and are capable of being members of their communities and that exclusion and 
segregation cannot be tolerated” (para. 30). 
 The mental health consumer movement has a history distinct from that of the disability 
rights movement (to be explored more fully later in this chapter), but much of its discourse draws 
heavily on the discourse of disability outlined above. The concepts of psychiatric disability and 
psychiatric rehabilitation (Gilfedder, 2010; Goldberg & Killeen, 2005; Weingarten, 2005) link 
the consumer and larger disability rights movements, and have facilitated ongoing efforts to 
more fully include protections and accommodations for psychiatric disability into policies 
protecting people with disabilities (Mechanic, 1998). 
The Origins of the Consumer Movement  
 In 1978, a book was published that would become the cornerstone text of the 
consumer movement. Written by Judi Chamberlin, who would become the “mother of the 
movement,” On Our Own “expose[d Chamberlin’s] own abuse at the hands of psychiatry and 
[gave] a detailed account of burgeoning consumer run alternatives” (Lewis, 2006, p. 339).  
Chamberlin, who would go on to write many more articles about consumer-driven approaches to 
mental distress, was herself someone who had been labeled as mentally ill as a young woman, 
and spent many years living with the personal and political implications of this label. Along with 
a growing group of activists, Chamberlin began to question and then to fight back against the 
powerful forces and assumptions that perpetuated abuses against people in the name of 
psychiatric treatment (Chamberlin, 1978). 
Chamberlin wrote On Our Own at a time when there was little recourse for people who 
had been labeled mentally ill or “crazy.” She wrote eloquently about her own experience of 
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learned helplessness: how previously functional and even happy people became “mental patients” 
via their time in mental health institutions. They were told they were crazy and sick, and so they 
became crazy and sick, less and less able to make choices for themselves (Chamberlin, 1978; 
Lewis, 2006). Chamberlin documented others’ stories as well, with repeating motifs of 
understandable distress (such as Chamberlin’s own despair after a miscarriage) being interpreted 
by professionals as mental disease. Rather than care and compassion, they were subjected to 
involuntary hospitalizations and were treated against their will with shock therapy, insulin 
therapy, and experimental drugging. Because they were seen as unable to make decisions for 
themselves, mental patients had no way of fighting back: dissent was seen simply as further 
evidence of mental illness (Chamberlin, 1978). 
Chamberlin, and others involved the early days of ex-patient organizing such as Patricia 
Deegan (1990) and Leonard Roy Frank (1982), wanted something different. The social and 
political climate of the 1970’s, with its energy and focus on civil rights activism, contributed to 
an environment in which they could begin to imagine fighting for change (Bluebird, n.d.).  As 
has been the case for many, if not all, anti-oppression and civil rights movements, the consumer 
movement began with consciousness-raising (Chamberlin, 1978; Chamberlin, 1990) – people 
helping themselves and one another begin to imagine that it was possible to take issue with the 
status quo; that perhaps things might not always be as they had been for so long.  
As these initial consciousness-raising efforts began, there was a focus on sharing stories. 
Members told the stories of their lives, of what had happened to them in hospitals and in other 
treatment settings, and the ways in which those “treatments” had shaped their sense of 
themselves and what they saw as their possibilities. While individual experiences varied, “it 
became clear that distinct patterns of oppression existed and that our problems and difficulties 
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were not solely internal and personal, as we had been told they were” (Chamberlin, 1990, para. 
13).  
As groups grew in numbers and membership, their goals expanded from consciousness-
raising to include a range of activist and support projects: lobbying on behalf of hospitalized 
patients, working to make broad policy changes on local and national levels, and organizing 
consumer-run alternatives to a mental health system that the movement agreed was broken at 
best (Chamberlin, 1990; Lewis, 2006). The movement crystallized around a growing 
understanding that the egregious treatment of people in hospitals and other psychiatric treatment 
settings were human rights abuses, and that systemic change was the only appropriate solution. 
That “crazy people” themselves were the most appropriate and knowledgeable advocates for 
systemic change was a notion that would shape the consumer movement; its impact and 
implications continue to reverberate today. 
Initially the movement was a bit more radical than its current manifestation. Words like 
inmate and survivor were used, indicating a clear sense of the mental health system as a 
tyrannical ruler. Scholars looking back have identified two general camps that emerged as the 
movement developed (Adame & Knudson, 2007; Chamberlin, 1990; Lewis, 2006). One major 
camp took the original radical stance and extended it. This group argues that mental illnesses 
may be a creation of powerful forces in society, or natural variations of human experiences of 
distress, but it rejects the idea that this distress can or should be “cured” by professional 
intervention and argues vociferously against the mental health system as a whole (Lewis, 2006). 
This camp, known variously as the psychiatric survivor or antipsychiatry movement, will be 
explored further in chapter 5. 
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What has become today’s consumer movement has emphasized a partnership model, 
focusing on consumer empowerment and peer services in collaboration with professionals 
(Adame & Knudson, 2007). Mental health treatment is presented as an individual process, one in 
which personal hopes and goals shape what treatment is appropriate and how it is accessed. This 
camp’s roots have remained more deeply entwined with the disability rights movement (Lewis, 
2006), and it is this camp – the consumer movement – that has had the most measurable impact 
on systems of mental health treatment, particularly in the English-speaking world (Gordon et al, 
2013). 
Recovery  
Disability discourse is very different from the discourses of illness (the biomedical model) 
or of moral/social failing. Connecting the concept of madness/mental distress to the concept of 
disability has allowed for a great deal of social action on behalf of the civil rights of people 
formerly labeled as “crazy” and warehoused without a voice (Lewis, 2006). This language – of 
disability and particularly of rehabilitation – has also given rise to one of the cornerstone 
concepts of the consumer movement, which is the idea of recovery.  
Like nearly all concepts related to human experience, recovery is difficult to 
operationalize and is understood at its root to be a highly individual experience. The literature of 
the consumer movement presents various definitions of recovery, and there is also a significant 
body of work on recovery that is written by mental health professionals (Gordon et al, 2013; 
Slade et al, 2014). One article (Leamy, Bird, Le Boutillier, Williams, & Slade, 2011) notes that 
professionals tend to define recovery via measurable outcomes (ability to hold down a job, 
compliance with treatment, symptom reduction, etc.), while consumer-driven definitions focus 
on recovery-as-process, emphasizing themes such as hope, meaning, and purpose as well as 
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empowerment. While each of these perspectives may be potentially useful, the consumer-driven 
concept of recovery as an individual and evolving process falls more in line with the 
empowerment focus of the movement itself (Chamberlin, 1990). Within this framework, 
recovery is removed from the more traditional/top-down perspective of social control, and places 
the right to determine the benchmarks of healing squarely in the hands of the individual 
consumer. 
The Impact of the Consumer Movement on Mental Health Treatment 
In the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia (Gordon et al, 2013; 
Leamy et al, 2011), the recovery model of mental health treatment, which is based – at least to an 
extent – in many of the principles of the consumer movement, has become a widely accepted 
approach to mental health treatment, and is used by many publically funded programs for 
individuals who have been diagnosed with “severe and persistent” mental illness (Gordon et al, 
2013). While the implementation of these programs remains problematic in many ways, it is a 
testament to the work of the consumer and disability rights movements that the language of 
independence and self-determination has been adopted by mainstream providers of mental health 
treatment.  
Increasingly, programs that receive government funding are employing peer support 
workers – paid staff hired on the basis of their own lived experience of madness, trauma, or 
mental health treatment (Bluebird, n.d; Chamberlin, 1990).  Some consumer-run drop-in centers, 
which are resource centers for people who self-identify as consumers, are receiving Department 
of Mental Health funding for some of their programs (Bluebird, n.d.), perhaps indicating an 
increasing understanding among mental health professionals and policy-makers of the value of 
non-professionalized approaches to ameliorating mental distress. Drop-in centers and similar 
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consumer-run resource centers are generally available to all people, whether or not they are 
engaged in mainstream treatment; this openness serves to de-hierarchize a part of the mental 
health system, recognizing that an individual’s choice to engage or not engage with the dominant 
framework around mental distress should not determine their access to support. 
Consumer voices are increasingly being heard across all levels of policy-making and 
treatment implementation, and the language of recovery and consumer advocacy has become 
commonplace in many – if not most – publically funded mental health care settings (Gordon et al, 
2013).  This is a direct result of decades of advocacy and against-all-odds dedication by 
consumer groups and individuals, and has had measurable positive impact, both on the 
experience of individuals and on the overall efficacy of treatment (Leamy et al, 2011). As is the 
case in any fight for civil rights, however, when policy begins to reflect the protections 
demanded by activists, some will say that the fight has been won. This argument reflects 
ignorance of the structural forces that support oppression even in the context of protective 
policies (Hinson & Bradley, 2006). In the next section, some of the structural and power 
imbalances that perpetuate oppression even in recovery-based models of care will be examined. 
Problems in the Implementation of Recovery Models of Care 
 In the 1970’s, long before the recovery model had been introduced into mental health 
care systems, Judi Chamberlin and her colleagues had already identified many ways in which 
partnership models could reify oppressive systems of power (Chamberlin, 1978). Chamberlin 
notes that partnership models, despite their supposedly flattened hierarchies, maintain a 
delineation between professional and client, well and ill, capable and dependent. Designed 
largely by professionals, these models of care place the power to determine success and failure in 
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the hands of those who also have the power to control access to resources and to identify 
consumers as “good” or “bad” recoverers (Chamberlin, 1978; Slade et al, 2014).  
 Nearly half a century later, after years of work on the part of consumers to make their 
voices heard in the mental health system, Slade et al (2014) published an overview of “uses and 
abuses” of the recovery model by professionals in mental health care. These modern-day 
concerns bear a striking resemblance to those voiced by Chamberlin and others in the early days 
of the movement. In addition to the familiar concerns about false partnership and 
misrepresentation of shared power, Slade et al (2014) identify a new set of abuses related to the 
recovery model’s growing familiarity as a treatment modality. These are focused on the 
misrepresentation of recovery as “the latest model” (p. 12), a perspective that can be picked up 
and discarded at will, and therefore might not warrant institutional investment of resources or 
attention. 
 Slade et al (2014) also illuminate a major concern posed by the professionalization of 
recovery: that adoption of recovery models by the mental health system can – and does – result 
in hijacking or co-opting of recovery principals. Numerous articles (Slade et al, 2014; Leamy et 
al, 2011; Gordon et al, 2013) have been published, either by consumers or with consumer input, 
expressing concerns that partnership models of care often have goals and benchmarks designed 
by professionals. These goals are often measured in terms of symptom reduction or benchmarks 
of normative functioning such as employment or ability to live independently (Leamy et al, 2011; 
Gordon et al, 2013). While some individual consumers might identify these as personal recovery 
goals, consumer activists point out that outcome-based measures of recovery with outcomes 
determined by professionals are both simplistic and potentially oppressive, reiterating the very 
power dynamics that the recovery-based models strive to challenge and to deconstruct (Slade et 
   36 
al, 2014).  A truly person-centered and recovery-focused model, they insist, does not strive to 
make people “normal” but to support people in building or re-building lives that are meaningful 
based on their own abilities, needs, hopes, and goals (Weinberg, 2013). 
 Another major question is whether any system can be said to be truly recovery-based 
when there is still the possibility of involuntary treatment. While consumer activists have 
partnered with providers with some significant success, the debate around compulsory 
medication and commitment remains with little resolution in sight (Agnetti, 2009). Many 
consumer advocates argue that, where the potential to force treatment remains, any suggestion of 
shared power or equality is a sham (Chamberlin, 1978; Frank, 1982).  Consumer groups have 
continued to advocate against forced treatment and for the rights of individuals to choose 
whether they identify as patients or not (Chamberlin, Rogers, & Sneed, 1989). In particular, they 
argue against forced treatment to prevent possible harmful behavior, citing that even the 
American Psychiatric Association admits that professionals have “no special knowledge or skills 
with which to predict dangerous behavior” (Agnetti, 2009, p. 39).  Under such circumstances, it 
remains uncertain whether recovery models of care can possibly reflect the goals of the 
consumer movement or if they are simply hegemonic efforts at social control dressed up in the 
clothing of empowerment. 
Conclusions 
 It is clear that the mental health consumer movement’s tireless activism over the last half-
century has been effective in changing the face of mental health treatment, particularly in the 
English-speaking West. This chapter has traced the development of the movement, with 
particular attention paid to its connection to the disability rights movement. Disability discourse 
has profoundly affected the trajectory of mental health consumer involvement in policy-making 
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and treatment design and implementation. It has provided a framework through which “mental 
illness” can be understood as a psychiatric disability rather than a sickness, and consumers as 
individuals deserving of protection and respect under the law (Lewis, 2006). The work of the 
consumer movement as well as the larger disability rights movement has vastly improved the 
quality of life and quality of care of many people who might once have been subjected to 
lifelong involuntary treatment and egregious abuse (Chamberlin, 1990).  
 The mainstreaming of consumer ideas, however, has some implications that are less than 
rosy as well. Valid concerns are raised regarding tokenism (Trivedi, 2010) and co-opting of 
consumer ideals by professionals and government entities (Slade et al, 2014). While the driving 
ideology of the mental health consumer movement can be summed up in the now-familiar slogan 
“nothing about us without us” (Sadler, Fulford, & Hoff, 2009, p. 607), some question whether it 
is possible for the kind of empowerment and self-determination demanded by this battle cry can 
ever be achieved in the context of the existing mental health care system (Adame & Knudson, 
2007). 
 In the following chapter, attention will be turned to the voices of some of those who 
voice these concerns. The psychiatric survivor movement, distinguished from the consumer 
movement in part due to its skepticism regarding cooperation with the mental health system, 
takes a more radical anti-establishment position in the fight against psychiatric oppression and 














The Psychiatric Survivor Movement 
The previous chapter traced the development of today’s mental health consumer 
movement, from its earliest days of radical anti-establishment organizing to its current 
partnership approach. The dovetailing of ex-patients and the larger disability rights efforts gave 
rise to the discourse of psychiatric disability, and the work of activists like Judi Chamberlin 
created inroads and connections between the two separate – but intimately connected – 
movements. These growing connections have allowed for tremendous progress to be made in the 
name of inclusion and empowerment for people who use mental health services, and policies are 
beginning to change to reflect respect for the expertise of consumers alongside professionals. 
As has been discussed in earlier chapters, the distinction between various “factions” of 
what has come to be called the consumer/survivor movement can be difficult to pinpoint (Adame 
& Knudson, 2007; Everett, 1994). Some scholars and activists feel that commonalities outweigh 
differences and ought to be foregrounded (Lewis, 2006) while others argue that the movements 
are ideologically distinct and reflect measurably different word-views and agendas (Everett, 
1994).  The question is further complicated by the historical reality that, even if they are 
ideologically distinct, the two camps are rooted in a shared history and have many shared heroes 
and leaders (Morrison, 2003).  
For the purposes of this thesis, I have separated the two movements in order to examine 
their different – though connected – discourses.  While each movement challenges the dominant 
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biomedical discourse, they do so in distinct ways with distinct epistemological differences that 
lead to differing conclusions about the meaning of madness. While the consumer movement’s 
alliance with the language of disability evidences its commitment to empowerment and self-
determination, the survivor movement’s challenge is even more existential. It lifts the burden of 
madness from the individual and places it squarely on society, framing deep psychic distress as a 
reasonable reaction to an unreasonable world (Lewis, 2006). 
The History of the Movement 
 The psychiatric survivor movement shares a great deal of history with the consumer 
movement. Indeed, the account of early days of grassroots organizing and consciousness-raising 
given in the preceding chapter is a part of the history of both movements, and the important 
figures (Judi Chamberlin, Leonard Roy Frank, Pat Deegan) are heroes and leaders in the eyes of 
consumers and survivors alike (Bluebird, n.d.; Chamberlin, 1978; Morrison, 2003). Chamberlin’s 
early works, for example, took a much more anti-establishment perspective, primarily before 
most inroads were made with the larger disability rights movement. In the 1970’s, when On Our 
Own was published and became the organizing text for those who had experienced abuse in the 
name of psychiatric treatment, the discourse of the movement had a more radical, or even 
militant, ring to it. Words like “inmate” were used to describe people held in psychiatric 
hospitals, and the language of radical action was reflected in the names that survivor groups 
chose for themselves, such as the Mental Patients Liberation Front (Chamberlin, 1978). 
 The progression of the ex-patients’ movements into what has become known as the 
consumer movement was documented in the previous chapter. The current chapter, however, 
focuses on the parallel progression of the more radical voices that remained more directly anti-
establishment and maintained their more radical stance. While the “legitimization” of consumer 
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activists by state and federal involvement and funding beginning in the 1980’s and 1990’s can be 
seen as an important coup, a more radical survivor perspective might view this involvement as 
the beginning of the slow co-opting of the movement by those in power (Morrison, 2003). 
 While the public face of the movement turned its attention to partnership and negotiation 
with the mental health system, anti-establishment voices that argued against the system 
altogether were not silenced entirely (Morrison, 2003). In response to the advent of the “Decade 
of the Brain” (Sabshin & Weissman, 1996) in the 1990’s, the survivor movement re-energized, 
bringing forth the original arguments and challenges to systems of power that fueled the actions 
of the 1970’s ex-patient groups (Morrison, 2003). With the burgeoning resource of the internet as 
a platform for organizing, survivor groups with a more radical human rights focus such as 
Mindfreedom, MadNation, and Support Coalition International continued to organize against the 
hegemony of medicalized psychiatry and the erasure of human experience by biomedical 
explanations for suffering (Joseph, 2013; Morrison, 2003). 
 In the 1990’s and into the 2000’s, leaders such as David Oaks (Morrison, 2003) and 
Justin Dart (Lewis, 2006) have emerged as prominent voices in the survivor movement. Inroads 
have been made with international human rights work, solidifying the movement’s position that 
the concerns of the survivor movement are, in fact, human rights concerns (Morrison, 2003). 
They call not only for a re-assessment of the way we treat people who experience madness or 
extreme states, but for a total overhaul of a system that they see as one that imprisons, tortures, 
and dehumanizes people for reasons that are – at best - poorly backed up by science and – at 
worst – lies designed to bring profit to drug companies and other major corporations (Mosher, 
1999). As has been the case in many liberatory human rights movements, there has been a push 
to reclaim a proud identity from one that has been shamed and oppressed; Mad Pride (Lewis, 
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2006) events now take place the world over, with activists taking to the streets to protest 
oppression by the psychiatric system and to take ownership of madness as a valuable – even 
cherished – identity with an important place in the world. 
Questioning Power, Questioning Truth 
 In order to more fully understand the perspective of the psychiatric survivor movement, 
this next section will take a more detailed look at the language and ideas that form its “dissident 
discourse.” Lewis (2006) presents a highly accessible breakdown of the movement’s dual 
epistemological (meaning-making) and political (policy-changing) mission, what he refers to as a 
struggle with “both truth and values” (p. 340). This framework is useful not only in 
understanding the movement as it currently exists, but in clarifying why and how the psychiatric 
survivor movement has adjusted its language and goals to the political climate, and the ways that 
the social/political environment has shaped the movement. One way of thinking about it is that 
while psychiatric survivor activism has at times centralized and joined forces with consumers, 
the epistemological aspect has remained much more radical, offering a wide range of 
explanations for extreme experiences that are directly opposed to both the biomedical model and, 
to an extent, to the disability model. Lewis suggests a three-part model that further explains the 
mission of the psychiatric survivor movement: to undermine “stereotyped representations of 
individualism, medicalization, and normality” (p. 340).  
Individualism. Lewis (2006) describes individualism as the perspective that madness 
is “a personal tragedy” (p. 340). This conceptualization is rooted in capitalist notions of 
individual responsibility – a mad person might be personally “afflicted,” but that affliction is 
located in the individual, and the proposed solution is similarly focused. Medical and 
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psychological interventions that seek to change a person’s biochemistry or cognitive processes, 
for instance, are evidence of a cultural affiliation with individualism. 
 The discourse of the survivor movement stands in direct opposition to the 
language of individualism. One very common thread in the literature of the movement is the idea 
that madness is frequently a result of cultural or interpersonal trauma (Adame, 2006). Personal 
narratives of madness often frame extreme experiences as understandable responses to traumas 
that shatter a person’s sense of self and the world. Madness is interpreted in its cultural context 
as a reaction to societal ills such as greed, isolationism, and materialism (Greenfield, 2013).  
 Within this anti-individualism frame, the appropriate response to madness also 
shifts. If madness is a distress signal, a sign that something in a person’s culture or environment 
is not right, the solution must be similarly located in the environment. Compassion, support, and 
meaning-making with others who share similar values and experiences are seen as the necessary 
conditions for healing. On a larger scale, madness is seen as a societal problem, and questions 
are raised about how to change the conditions of society that elicit such intense expressions of 
pain and distress (Lewis, 2006). 
Medicalization.  Medicalization refers, simply put, to the reign of the biomedical 
model as discussed earlier in this thesis. It is the prevailing explanatory discourse in Western 
societies, providing a framework for understanding problems that upholds individualism (Lewis, 
2006). In a Foucauldian sense, it also (re)produces the power of the biomedical field by 
reinforcing the idea that only those with specialized (medical) knowledge have the power to 
address problems of human suffering. 
 The psychiatric survivor movement is particularly invested in contesting 
medicalization because it is in the name of medical care that so many of the movement’s 
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members have experienced abuse (Adame, 2006; Bluebird, n.d.; Chamberlin, 1990). Many 
survivor organizations, particularly Mindfreedom International (Lewis, 2006) run ongoing 
information campaigns designed to bring nuance and skepticism into the conversation about 
medical explanations for madness. They demand that practitioners be honest regarding how little 
is truly known about the etiology and “cure” of mental illness, interrupting the hegemony of the 
medical field. Many survivor organizations are also invested in exposing what they believe to be 
the extraordinarily high risk of many psychiatric drugs, questioning the assertion that the medical 
field knows enough about how these drugs work to assert that the potential benefits outweigh the 
documented risks (Bola & Mosher, 2002).  
Normality . The final piece of Lewis’ (2006) three-part model refers to the power of the 
normal/abnormal binary. Perhaps more than anything, this concept shores up medicalization, 
enforcing the ideas that some individuals (in this case, individual minds) are normal and others 
are not, and therefore must be fixed. In challenging this dichotomy (between valued and 
devalued, right and wrong, well and ill) the psychiatric survivor movement challenges some of 
the most powerful underpinnings of modern society. Many argue that their experiences of 
extreme states and even of intense mental distress are not indicators of abnormal brains (Adame, 
2006). These states can be experienced as valued abilities, as deep insight and capacity for 
critical engagement, or as a process of spiritual awakening. Removing the imperative to assess 
for normality, they argue, leaves space to understand “mental illness” for what it has to offer to 
the individual and to society (Lewis, 2006). 
Individualism, medicalization, and normality work together to perpetuate a system that 
pathologizes certain kinds of bodies and minds. Each theme works with the others to create a 
framework in which it has come to seem natural or even obvious that mental distress should be 
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interpreted as a problem within an individual, attributable to biological causes, and in need of 
correction. The psychiatric survivor movement seeks to destabilize that framework by 
undermining each theme and therefore interrupting the feedback loop that perpetuates the current 
discourse.  
It is no wonder that the psychiatric survivor movement experiences such tremendous 
ridicule, pushback, and vitriol. After all, its mission is not simply to change how mental health 
services are delivered. Even the consumer movement’s powerful change efforts and their 
demand to have consumer voices heard and respected in the mental health system at least 
maintains some acceptance that there ought to be a mental health system (Adame & Knudson, 
2007). In contrast, those who consider themselves psychiatric survivors are attacking the system 
at a much deeper level, questioning the nature of reality and revealing assumptions that have 
been accepted as truths. 
Voices of Dissident Professionals 
 The psychiatric survivor movement is frequently (and mistakenly) associated with the 
academic and professional perspective known as anti-psychiatry (Oaks, 2006). I hesitated to 
include a section on anti-psychiatry in this chapter, wanting to avoid re-enacting the silencing of 
survivors’ voices and privileging of the voices of professionals. At the same time, the 
contributions of dissident professionals – largely psychiatrists – such as Thomas Szaz, R.D. 
Laing, and Loren Mosher have been important in the development of the voice and language of 
the psychiatric survivor movement (Lewis, 2006).  Their “expert” support has been “a very 
important means to challenge and undermine the authority of the existing structures of the mental 
health system and encourage others to speak out against the dominant narratives of diagnosis and 
treatment” (Morrison, 2003, p. 94). 
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 Because the focus of this work is on survivor voices, I will offer just a brief summary of 
the contributions of Szasz, Laing, and Mosher. They are by no means the only “expert” voices 
that have been important to the movement, but they are particularly well-known and frequently 
cited as allies in survivor literature. R.D. Laing is best known for what has become known as 
anti-psychiatry. A doctor who worked primarily with people diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
Laing was interested in the meaning of experiences such as hallucinations and delusions. He took 
the position that psychosis, rather than being an expression of individual defect, was a 
meaningful and essentially sane response to an insane world (Lewis, 2006). 
 Thomas Szasz is known by many in the psychiatric field as a radical for his position that 
mental illness is, in essence, a myth (Lewis, 2006).  His arguments follow an essentially 
Foucauldian structure, noting the systems of power that create and reinforce the myth of mental 
illness and the punishment/corrective action that is taken in the form of involuntary treatment of 
all kinds (Szasz, 1992). Szasz is not generally beloved by his psychiatric peers, but his arguments 
against involuntary commitment and other forms of forced psychiatric treatment have served to 
both inspire and scaffold the work of the psychiatric survivor movement (Lewis, 2006, Morrison, 
2003). 
 Loren Mosher, also a psychiatrist who worked primarily with those diagnosed with 
psychosis, was the creator of an alternate model of treating and understanding schizophrenia and 
other extreme states (Morrison, 2003). His Soteria Model (Bola & Mosher, 2003) was essentially 
a therapeutic community approach that treated psychosis as a “developmental crisis” and used 
emotional and spiritual support and safety much more often (and, reportedly, to better effect) 
than psychoactive drugs. Mosher was also well known for his resignation from the American 
Psychiatric Society in 1998, citing his disillusionment with the APA’s alliance with drug 
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companies and unilateral adherence to the biomedical model (Mosher, 1999; Oaks, 2004). 
Mosher was beloved as a friend and ally to the psychiatric survivor movement, and was on the 
board of Mindfreedom International, a major survivor organization (Oaks, 2004). 
Conclusion 
 The present chapter has looked at the psychiatric survivor movement and its dual efforts 
to make substantive practical change as well as to challenge the prevailing understanding of 
madness and its meaning. Not surprisingly, the pushback against the survivor movement has 
been both more aggressive and more dismissive than the arguments against the consumer 
movement  (Morrison, 2003). This may be in large part because psychiatric survivors seem to 
pose a much greater threat to powerful parties: they are not satisfied by partnership or allegiances 
with mental health system, but continually question and criticize and shed light upon the nature 
of the system itself. 
 Survivors have an especially daunting task because in speaking out against psychiatric 
oppression they always run the risk of their voices being silenced or ignored. The very 
experiences that bring them to the movement – surviving the abuses of psychiatry – can be used 
to dismiss their legitimacy or ability to think and argue. Because the abuses against which they 
fight are perpetrated in the name of benevolence (protecting “mentally ill” people from 
themselves and/or protecting society from their behavior) and are supported by scientific inquiry, 
survivors must strike a careful balance between righteous outrage and counter-arguments 
couched in language that the scientific community can understand and is willing to hear (Lewis, 
2006).  
Partnerships with allied “experts” add perceived legitimacy to the movement’s arguments, 
but the risk is also run of these professional voices co-opting or overshadowing survivor voices, 
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effectively re-enacting the very system of power and control against which they fight. Layered 
over this dilemma is an ideological and political dilemma: if the battle is against the mental 
health system, is it useful or wise to partner with the system at all, even with dissident members?  
 The following chapter will take up where this and the previous chapter have left off, and 
will engage with some of the questions that the movements themselves struggle with in forming 
alliances and articulating arguments. In particular, I will focus on the intersection of professional 
and consumer/survivor experiences. How can mental health professionals ally with these 
grassroots civil rights movements without reiterating oppressive systems of power? What are the 
challenges and potential risk of such alliances? I will also spend some time exploring the 
experiences of those whose identities straddle the boundaries between professional and current or 
former “client” of mental health services, whose experiences have led them to choose to be a part 





























When I set out to write this thesis, I had a certain idea about what I would find or what I 
would want to say. I also had a certain perception about the mental health consumer and 
psychiatric survivor movements, their differences and connections. As I read and understood 
more, my understanding of these delineations changed, leading to more – not less – complexity 
and more questions about the structure and purpose of the thesis itself. One concern that has been 
mentioned at times throughout the thesis is the question of interconnectedness between the 
movements. I have struggled with the “dangerous usefulness” (Brooks, 2012) of separating the 
consumer and survivor movements. What risks might I be taking or subtleties might I be 
overlooking by writing and researching as though the movements were truly separate? 
Conversely, what might be lost by following the trend and referring to the consumer/survivor 
movement as a single entity? 
Because this work takes its lead in part from discourse analysis, and particularly given 
the attention paid in Chapter 3 to the social discourses surrounding and shaping the manifestation 
and understanding of madness, I paid particular attention to the language and discourse of the 
movements. Ultimately, my decision to look separately at the consumer and survivor movement 
was influenced by discourses that seem to be different in important ways, despite a shared 
history and a number of shared ideals. 
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The differing discourses of the consumer and survivor movements point to, among other 
things, different understandings of what madness is, what it means, and what constitutes 
appropriate social action. One useful comparison might be to think of the difference between 
second-wave feminism, with its focus on leveling the playing field, equality in the workplace, 
and policy to protect women’s rights (Braithewaite, 2002) with third-wave feminism. Third-
wave theory, which integrates critical race theory, queer theory, and other post-structuralist 
perspectives, seeks to go beyond male/female equality by questioning the reality of the gender 
binary and other essentialist categories (Hardin & Whiteside, 2012). In this comparison, the 
consumer movement might be analogous to second-wave feminism; its discourse challenges 
systems of power that prevent consumers from acting on their own behalf and making decisions 
for themselves. The consumer movement has worked within the mental health system and in 
partnership with providers to make consumers’ voices heard and to create and enforce policies 
that protect consumers’ rights (Chamberlin, 1990). The survivor movement, in contrast, calls into 
question the very reality of sanity and madness, just as third-wave or post-structuralist feminism 
questions the relevance and existence of gender binaries outside of their social and political 
contexts.  
Of course, the same criticism that applies to the “wave” model of feminism applies to the 
above analogy: that framing a movement in terms of waves implies chronological progression 
and ignores parallel or concurrent developments, or the ways in which differing goals and 
ideologies intersect and influence one another. The histories of the consumer and survivor 
movements as recounted in the preceding chapters are clearly not only interconnected, but are 
interdependent. Could consumer rights advocacy have taken place without the fire and 
radicalism of the early ex-patients’ organizations? Without the cumulative weight of the 
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consumer movement’s partnership efforts, would survivors’ more radical epistemological 
argument have garnered as much attention as it has from researchers and critical thinkers in the 
fields of sociology and psychology? I would argue that the answer to both of these questions is a 
resounding no. 
Perhaps the best way to understand or frame the consumer and survivor movements, then, 
is as a pair of offshoot movements stemming from a common source. In order to adequately 
understand either one, it is important to understand the other. Furthermore, in order to fully 
understand the two together, it is vital to understand the social and political forces that were at 
play in the early days of ex-patient organizing, and how those forces have continued to shape the 
movements as they develop. Holding a dual awareness of the separateness and connectedness 
allows for a dialectical approach, making space for the range of identities, agendas, and realities 
that are contained between and among the two movements. With this dialectic in mind, I will 
now turn to some reflections on the implications of consumer and survivor frameworks for the 
tasks and identities of mental health professionals, particularly social workers. 
Consumer/Survivors and Professional Social Work 
More and more frequently, social work literature is concerned with the potential ethical 
conflicts posed by the field’s commitment to social justice and its identification – intentional or 
otherwise – with systems of power that have historically been oppressive or abusive (Park, 
2008a). The field’s stated commitment to self-determination, as discussed in the introduction to 
this work, clashes with the reality that social workers are often tasked with enforcing social 
norms and controlling access to resources (Joseph, 2013). In the following sections, I will look at 
the ways in which social workers and other clinicians might interact with the ideas and actions of 
the consumer and survivor movements. 
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Social workers as activists. As social workers, where should our allegiance lie? 
Joseph (2013) reviews the history of abuse and coercion in the name of mental health treatment 
and concludes that “the professed values of the social work profession are actually more 
compatible with psychiatric-survivor movements than with allegiances to the biomedical model 
of psychiatry” (p. 267). Joseph’s article carefully examines the professed values of the social 
work profession, compares them to the history of the medicalization of human distress, and finds 
the match a poor one. He suggests that social workers can and should ally with psychiatric 
survivor movements by listening to and advocating for the changes that they demand. At the 
same time, social workers’ position of privilege (professional status) must not co-opt the voices 
of survivors themselves. Professional advocacy can only be truly effective in the context of 
listening first for what the experts – survivors themselves – have to say and allowing their 
knowledge to shape social action.  
Although Joseph (2013) makes a strong distinction between consumer and survivor 
perspectives, I would add that this framework for professional allyship/activism applies as well 
to working alongside consumer activists. While the consumer movement has become far more 
familiar to and accepted by the mental health system than the survivor movement, the threat of 
the co-opting consumer voices by providers remains. Dissident and progressive clinicians can 
work against the subtle silencing of consumer voices by remaining vigilant to this possibility. 
Certainly an increased awareness of the fluidity and socially constructed nature of a biomedical 
understanding – or any socially enforced understanding – of madness asks that professionals 
slow down and question our assumptions about who possesses knowledge about the needs and 
experiences of people in distress. From this place of questioning, perhaps true allyship with both 
consumers and survivors is more possible.  
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Burstow (2004) suggests a range of actions that “progressive psychotherapists” (p. 141) 
might take to support and join consumer and survivor groups in their efforts. These include co-
writing articles with survivor experts, helping clients access survivor or consumer supports, 
publicly endorsing/supporting statements made by movement groups, and mounting joint 
campaigns around education or policy-making. Burstow (2004) and Joseph (2013) both 
emphasize that these actions are conditional on professionals respecting the expertise of 
consumers and survivors over and above professional experience and training.  
Social workers as therapists. With the growing emphasis on biomedical models of 
diagnosis and treatment and evidence-based/manualized therapies, clinical social workers and 
other therapists are encouraged – and frequently required - to rely more on therapies with 
standardized steps and quantifiable outcomes such as cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) 
(Adame, 2006). Many in the consumer and survivor communities take issue with these types of 
therapies, stating that they offer “temporary life-style solutions to people’s problems in living 
rather than addressing the larger cultural and political contexts from which these problems have 
emerged” (Adame, 2006, p. 68). Further survivor critiques of manualized approaches to 
treatment include their location of problems in individuals, their adherence to biological 
explanations for suffering, and their focus on symptom reduction (assimilation) over personal 
fulfillment and human connection (Adame, 2006). Essentially, these are critiques of the 
hegemony of individualism, medicalization, and normality (Lewis, 2006) that propels oppressive 
systems of control in the name of care. 
In her moving account of the “spirit breaking” that occurs in forced treatment for mental 
distress, Deegan (1990), herself a psychiatric survivor, suggests that empowering and respectful 
therapy occurs when “both parties are available to "be moved by" the thoughts, perceptions, and  
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feelings of the other” (p. 309). She refers to the development of relational and intersubjective 
therapy models as alternatives that allow for creative, individualized, and mutual healing 
relationships between therapists and the people they serve. Narrative and other postmodern 
approaches to therapy that emphasize strength and meaning while locating problems in the 
individual and cultural stories in which they are embedded are also viable alternatives to 
behavioral and biological approaches (Combs & Freedman, 2012). 
Therapy is often available on what is essentially a tiered or stratified basis, with insight-
based and relationship-focused approaches available primarily to those who have more 
privileged identities, financial resources, and “sanity.” Those who have been identified as less 
sane/more “mentally ill,” and/or who have oppressed identities (particularly in terms of race and 
class) are more likely to be offered manualized or biologically based treatments that prioritize 
normalizing behavior over seeking insight, finding connection, or making meaning (Zrenchik & 
McDowell, 2012). A commitment to practicing relational or narrative therapy – and striving to 
practice in such a way that makes these therapies available to all - might then be considered a 
form of therapist activism. 
Crossover clinicians: Managing multiple identities. I identified myself early in 
this thesis as an individual with a personal interest in the topic at hand. As a social worker and as 
a person who has navigated my own experiences of mental/emotional distress, I am particularly 
interested in the intersection of consumer or survivor and professional identities. In my 
exploration of the literature of the consumer and survivor movements, I was surprised to see how 
little has been written about the experiences of those who straddle both worlds. It is common to 
see distinctions made between consumers/survivors and professionals that do not leave room for 
the possibility that some individuals might identify as both. What literature exists on this topic 
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tends to focus on the experience of stigma faced by those mental health professionals who 
choose to “come out” to their colleagues about their survivor or consumer identities (Adame, 
2011). Given this, it is understandable that many crossover clinicians might choose not to reveal 
their dual identities at all in their professional lives. It is also important to note that some 
movement groups, particularly survivor groups, may not welcome the participation of 
professionals and may understandably view those with dual identities as traitors to the cause 
(Burstow, 2004). 
 Despite the challenges to owning and managing dual identities, there have been survivor-
therapists who have been leaders in both the consumer and survivor movements. Ronald 
Bassman (1997), Dan Fisher (1994), Bonnie Burstow (2004), and Patricia Deegan (1990) are 
mental health professionals who have been open about their experiences as consumers and/or 
survivors and who have utilized their dual identities to enhance both their clinical work and their 
activism. Adame (2011), in her qualitative study on the experiences of survivor-therapists, notes 
that most of her interviewees entered the field out of a desire to help others avoid the abuses they 
experienced themselves.  
Adame’s (2011) findings point to several broad themes that have implications for overall 
development of the clinical field and the consumer/survivor movements as well as for 
collaboration and for “lessening the dichotomies between ‘us and them’” (p. 335). One is that 
survivor-therapists, who have had clinical training as well as personal experience of treatment, 
seem to favor the relational, experiential, and insight-based approaches to therapy discussed 
earlier over behavioral or biologically-based treatments. As mental health care continues to move 
towards more quantifiable and manualizable treatments, those clinicians who work with more 
humanistic approaches may find allies in the consumer and survivor movements, forging 
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important collaborations and mobilizing for change. Adame’s (2011) participants are clear that 
they see a role for therapists and other mental health professionals even as they continue to 
criticize the prevailing discourse and systems of power that promote oppressive treatment in the 
mental health system. They urge both professionals and the consumer and survivor movements 
to strive for more nuanced evaluations, suggesting that those survivor activists who have 
denounced any kind of professional mental health care might feel differently about voluntary, 
humanistic therapy than they do about forced hospitalization and drugging. Finally, the survivor-
therapists who participated in this study are clear that progressive/radical therapists and the 
survivor movement need one another’s support and collaboration, and that continued courage, 
humility, and risk-taking on both sides is necessary in order to forge meaningful and useful 
connections across difference. 
Areas For Further Exploration  
 In my attempt to give an adequate overview of the complex topics contained in this thesis, 
I have not spent much time focusing on the intersection of psychiatric oppression with other 
kinds of oppression. This intersection could – and perhaps should – be the topic of its own major 
work. The history of psychiatry and related mental health professions is one rife with examples 
of systematic oppression in the form of diagnosing and pathologizing race, gender, ability, 
sexuality, and class (Joseph, 2013). One particularly egregious example is that of the 1800’s 
diagnosis of drapetomania - the “mental disease” that caused slaves to run away without 
provocation (Joseph, 2013).  Homosexuality’s history of diagnosis and treatment is more well-
known, and points again to the ways in which time, place, and political/social environment shape 
the manifestation and meaning of all kinds of identities and behaviors.  
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 There have been concerns raised that the prominent voices in the consumer and survivor 
movements are overwhelmingly white and middle-class (Trivedi, 2010). While the movements 
have a long history of shared ideals and shared activism with the feminist movement (Deegan, 
1990), there has perhaps been less public attention paid to the realities of consumers and 
survivors who also identify as people of color or who come from poverty. How might the 
experience of the mental health system differ for people who experience oppression on multiple 
levels? Bringing critical (race) theory, with its focus on institutional oppressions (Brown, 2010), 
to bear on the discourse of the consumer and survivor movements as well as on the dominant 
psychiatric discourse might be one way to further explore these important ideas and experiences 
and to work towards dismantling oppressive systems of all kinds as they relate to madness and 
mental distress. 
Final Reflections 
 Feminist and other post-structuralist research approaches acknowledge – even celebrate – 
the subjectivity of the researcher and the interconnectedness of researcher identity with the 
process of inquiry (Burman, 2009). In that spirit, my own experience, identity, and curiosity has 
fueled this project and has shaped the questions I have asked and the answers, however complex, 
that have emerged. It also seems important to acknowledge that, while I have attempted to be 
aware of my own biases and the limitations of my experience, it is certain that there are things I 
have missed, misunderstood, or misinterpreted unknowingly, and that another researcher might 
have asked similar questions and arrived at different answers.  
 To review, the questions that guided my inquiry have focused on meaning (where did the 
concept of mental illness come from? How valid is it? Who has benefitted - and who has been 
harmed - by a biomedical explanation of distress? How have the consumer and survivor 
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movements challenged the hegemony of this explanation?) as well as practice (what do these 
challenges to the dominant discourse mean for social workers and other clinicians? Is there a 
way to move towards ethical practice while supporting the ideas and values of the movements? 
What place is there for clinicians who also identify as consumers or survivors?). Many of these 
questions do not have concrete answers, but generate an ongoing process of examining 
assumptions, listening to dissenting voices, and re-evaluating existing systems of knowledge.  
 It is my hope that the process of inquiry that guided me in exploring these issues – 
psychiatric oppression, social construction, and especially the powerful alternative frameworks 
proposed by those who have experienced madness and oppression first-hand – has produced a 
piece of beginning scholarship that can be of use to others. In order to avoid the pitfalls of the 
“helping professions” – condescension, colonization, erasure of identity and experience – it is 
essential to ask questions about how we know what we (think we) know, and who has the power 
to construct and disseminate that knowledge. The process of calling into question what is 
“known” about competency, about distress, and about what constitutes a life worth living beyond 
the trifecta of individualism, medicalization, and normality, is a humbling one. It is, however, 
necessary to the practice of ethical social work, and even more so to the process of bringing a 
“liberatory consciousness” (Love, 2010) to clinical practice. 
 I have tended to feel torn between my commitment to clinical social work and my 
skepticism about biomedical explanations for human distress, struggling to find a balance that 
takes into account both my genuine belief in the potential healing power of therapy and my 
commitment to dismantling oppressive institutions. Adame (2011) notes in her study of survivor 
therapists that for clinicians who hold “unconventional and critical views on the mental health 
care system, it is all too easy (and detrimental) to fall into a cynical and pessimistic mindset 
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about the profession” (p. 336). Delving into the history and epistemology of these grassroots 
movements may be one antidote to that pessimistic mindset; the possibility of collaboration 
between these movements and progressive/dissident professionals suggests all kinds of potential 
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